Three-factor multiserver authentication protocols become a prevalence in recent years. Among these protocols, almost all of them do not involve the registration center into the authentication process. To improve the protocol's efficiency, a common secret key is shared among all severs, which leads to a serious weakness; i.e., we find that these protocols cannot resist the passive attack from the honest-but-curious servers. This paper takes Wang et al.'s protocol as an example, to exhibit how an honest-but-curious server attacks their protocol. To remedy this weakness, a novel three-factor multiserver authentication protocol is presented. By introducing the registration center into the authentication process, the new protocol can resist the passive attack from the honestbut-curious servers. Security analyses including formal and informal analyses are given, demonstrating the correctness and validity of the new protocol. Compared with related protocols, the new protocol possesses more secure properties and more practical functionalities than others at a relatively low computation cost and communication cost.
Introduction
Nowadays, with the rapid development of networks, remote communication becomes increasingly prevalent and provides highly useful services in many aspects. Consequently, communication security significantly attracts public's attention. Cryptographic authentication allows users to submit their credentials and acquire authorization to access the various online services from remote networks [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Since Lamport [6] firstly proposed a password-based remote authentication protocol, great quantities of authentication protocols were proposed to make up continued emerging problems and provide authorized communication between remote entities. However, the traditional protocols gradually cannot catch up with the pace of increasing demand for more users and servers in communication. Multiserver authentication schemes became the mainstream, because most of the practical communication environments are based on several servers to alleviate the pressure of the increasing number of users.
Lots of authentication protocols for multiserver environments were proposed to satisfy the security requirements and provide versatile functionalities to make the scheme more convenient and practical to utilize in real occasions [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . In 2001, Li et al. [7] proposed a remote multiserver authentication protocol with no verification table, which was found insecure by Lin et al. [8] . They also presented an improved protocol, while it was vulnerable to impersonation attack [9] . Juang et al. [10] adopted symmetric-key cryptosystem to propose a multiserver authentication protocol but it was cracked soon. In 2004, a novel protocol was presented by Chang and Lee [11] . However, all of them ignored user 2 Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing anonymity [12] . In 2009, a remote multiserver authentication scheme which satisfies anonymity property was proposed [13] , but it does not have forward security [14] . Besides, Hsiang and Shih [15] presented a new protocol to resist various attacks; however some drawbacks on mutual authentication are pointed out [16] . Recently, a big breakthrough, i.e., the inner relationships of evaluation criteria for anonymous two-factor authentication protocol, is explored by Wang et al. [17] . To improve the security of remote communication, smart card gradually came into use in authentication, which made it possible for more convenient authentication and communication. Some remote authentication protocols for multiserver environment with a smart card were proposed but proved to be insecure in the end [21] [22] [23] .
Relying on smart card and password as the authentication method already cannot meet today's needs. In the latest few years, more and more authentication protocols adopt biometrics messages in mutual authentication to strengthen the security and enhance the efficiency of the existing protocols. In 2010, Yang et al. [24] introduced a three-factor multiserver authentication protocol. Unfortunately, the protocol has low computation efficiency and can not resist the insider attack. Li et al. proposed an efficient protocol [25] which allows users to change the password and the calculation cost is low. However, their scheme cannot provide appropriate certification and failed to resist man-in-the-middle attack [26] . Adopting elliptic curve cryptography, Yoon et al. [27] in 2011 designed a novel protocol; unfortunately Kim et al. [28] showed that Yoon et al. [27] protocol is insecure. In 2014, Chuang et al. [29] put forward an anonymous protocol, but Mishra et al. [30] broke their protocol. Later, Lu et al. [31] found that there are several weaknesses in Mishra et al. 's improved protocol, and they also presented an improved protocol which is broken by Reddy et al. [32] . Meanwhile, Wang et al. [33] All of the above three-factor multiserver authentication protocols can be categorized into two classes, i.e., the protocols which implement the authentication independent of the registration center and the protocols which need the help of the registration center in the authentication phase. After carefully examining the known three-factor multiserver authentication protocols, we find that almost all of the first kind of protocols cannot resist the passive attack from an honest-but-curious server since all servers share a common secret key. More precisely, an honest-but-curious server can compute session keys which are shared between a user and other servers by eavesdropping messages transmitting between the users and other servers. In this paper, we take Wang et al.'s protocol as an example, to show how an honestbut-curious server obtains a session key which should be kept secret from him. Moreover, we find some other drawbacks in their protocol. For example, in the reregister or revocation phase, a user can still use his original password to login and send message even if he is revoked.
To resist the passive attack from the honest-but-curious servers, a trivial solution is to distribute different secret keys to different severs, which would aggravate the user's storage burden. Another method is introducing the registration center into the authentication phase to deal with secret messages. As we mentioned above, such protocols are based on either ECC or symmetric encryption cryptosystems, which heavily affect the computation efficiency. To balance the security problem brought by the honest-but-curious servers and the efficiency problem brought by involving the registration center into the authentication, we propose a novel multiserver authentication protocol. In authentication phase of new protocol, the involved registration center only adopts hash and XOR operations for the computation, instead of ECC and symmetric cryptosystem, thus greatly improving the protocol's computation efficiency. As far as we known, this is the first time to consider the passive attack from honestbut-curious servers for multiserver authentication protocols. Moreover, the new protocol is the first protocol which only adopts hash and XOR operations for computation when involving the registration center into the authentication.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews and analyzes the security of Wang et al. 's protocol. In Section 3, we present the new three-factor multiserver authentication scheme in detail. Section 4 provides the formal and informal secure analysis of the new protocol. In Section 5, comparisons including security, functionalities, computation cost, and communication cost are conducted. The last section gives a conclusion.
Some Weakness of Wang et al.'s Scheme
We firstly give the details about Wang et al.'s protocol and then show how an honest-but-curious server attacks their protocol step by step. (iv) displaces with , with , and with , respectively.
Revocation and Reregistration Phase
(i) If is revoked, he needs to send verification message to securely.
(ii) checks the validity of . If is a valid user, sets < , = 0 >. 
Passive Attack from an Honest-But-Curious Server.
In this attack, an honest-but-curious server (say ) only passively eavesdrops messages between the user and other servers, so that he can obtain the session keys shared by the user and other servers which should be kept secret from using his secret key and eavesdropping messages. More precisely, suppose a user has finished the protocol with a server 1 and is running the protocol with the other server 2 . Now we will show how the server 1 obtains the session key between and 2 step by step.
(i) Step 1. 1 finished the protocol with successfully. Thus the server has knowledge of .
(ii)
Step 2. During the protocol process between and
(iii)
Step 3. After that, 1 intercepts the messages { , 3 4 } which are sent from 2 to . Then the server 1 obtains 2 by calculating 2 = 3 ⊕ ℎ( ‖ 1 ) ⊕ ℎ( ). In this case, the server 1 acquired 1 and 2 generated in this session.
(iv) Step 4. With the intercepted and , 1 can obtain the session key by calculating = ℎ( ‖ ‖ 1 ‖ 2 ) successfully which should be kept secret from him.
User's Anonymity.
User's anonymity means that user's and other urgent information indicating user's identity directly should be protected carefully. In Wang et al.'s scheme, an honest-but-curious server can compute 1 by 1 = ⊕ 1 ⊕ ℎ( ). At the same time, receives from . can obtain 's identity by computing = ⊕ ℎ( 1 ). As a consequence, the server can obtain of the user . This does not guarantee the anonymity of the user's identity.
User Impersonation Attack.
The honest-but-curious server can collect and which are sent by and thus can calculate using . After that, can pretend to be and apply authentication from other servers. Specifically, randomly choose a number 1 and calculates
Then sends { , , 1 , 2 , , } to other servers through a public channel. In this way, can disguise as .
Wrong Revocation and Reregistration.
In this phase, users are allowed to revoke or reregister when he confronts the situation about losing the smart card or his account. In Wang et al.'s scheme, when a user wants to revoke his account, he has to pass the authentication. After that, changes to 0, indicating that is not available any more. In the reregistration phase, also changes to + 1. However, is not involved in login phase and authentication phase. As a result, there is no access for to check whether the user's account is revoked or not. Thus the user can access the legal servers only using his former password and his biometrics; even he already has been revoked. . As a result, an honest-but-curious server with can obtain all session keys which should be kept secret from him. This attack usually exists in the multiserver environment. In the most cases, a legitimate server after registration is assumed to be completely trustworthy, without taking into account the possibility that a particular server can act as an honest-but-curious adversary.
Reasons for the
To resist this attack, it is bound to distribute different secret keys to different servers, which can be implemented by involving the registration center in the authentication process. Unfortunately, in most of this kind of protocol, authentication process is excused between the user and the server independent of the registration center. Therefore, to design a secure three-factor authentication protocol against the passive attack from an honest-but-curious server, the registration center should be introduced into the authentication process to protect the important temporary secret values 1 and 2 .
The New Protocol
In this section, we first discuss the threat model used in our protocol. We then give the list of notations used in our proposed scheme. Finally, we describe the different phases relate to our scheme.
Threat Model.
In this subsection, we introduce a threat model following the definition of [36] [37] [38] [39] . 
The Proposed Protocol. As Wang et al.'s protocol, the new
protocol also involves five phases. Table 2 lists the notations used in the new protocol.
Registration Phase (i) Server registration phase
During server registration, communicates with to authenticate his validity and become a legislative server after receiving the preshared key sent from . The whole process of the server registration phase is shown in Figure 1 .
(a) sends a request message to . (b) authorizes and adds a novel entry < , > to the database where is a random number. Then ℎ( ), is sent to by applying IKEv2 securely. (c) adopts , to protect the urgent messages and generates the session key .
(ii) User registration phase A user sends his personal information to and gets his own smart card by executing the process listed in Figure 2 .
(a) inputs at the sensor and can obtain { , } using ( ) → ( , 
Login Phase.
A user tries to login to a server by executing the steps shown in Figure 3. (i) inputs , , and * , then his smart card can recover * using ( * , ) → * .
(ii) computes * = ℎ( ‖ * ) and then checks whether ℎ( ‖ * ) = or not. If it is true, calculates ℎ( ) = ⊕ , = ⊕ , and ℎ( ) = ⊕ . Otherwise, does not pass the identity authentication.
(iii) generates a number 1 randomly for each session and calculates ℎ( ) = ⊕ ,
where is a timestamp.
(iv) sends { , 1 , 2 , , , } to .
Authentication
Phase. This phase offers the details of mutually authentication which are indicated in Figure 3 .
(i) receives the information from and verifies whether − ≤ Δ holds or not. If it holds, calculates = ⊕ ⊕ ℎ( ) and = ⊕ ℎ( ). Otherwise, will reject the login request. Then checks whether 2 = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ‖ ). If it fails, the protocol would be stopped. Otherwise, the server computes = ⊕ℎ( ), 9 and checks whether the equation ℎ( ‖ 1 ‖ 2 ) = 9 holds or not. If so, a secret session key is generated successfully and can be used in the following communication. Otherwise, would reject the authentication.
Password Change Phase.
Using this phase, 's password can be changed without any exchanging message from both and .
(i) inputs , the old password , and imprints as well and computes = ℎ( ‖ ) which is used to pass the authentication.
(ii) inputs a new password . After that, computes
(iii) replaces , , , , and with , , , , and .
User Revocation or Reregistration
Phase. This phase is used for revocation and reregistration when 's smart card is stolen or lost.
(i) In revocation phase, sends revocation requests to . chooses a negative random number and modifies the value of corresponding to as that random number.
(ii) In reregistration phase, sends reregistration requests to .
selects a positive random number and sets it as of . [40] and widely used to analyze the security protocol. In this subsection, BAN logic is used to prove that mutual authentication can be obtained after running the new protocol successfully. The notations and postulates in BAN logic are listed in Table 3 .
Security Analysis of the New Protocol
We first define the test goals which the new protocol should achieve using BAN logic:
Secondly, we give the idealized form of the new protocol as follows:
Next, we list the following initiative premises of the new protocol: The formula is combined with the formula
The message-meaning rule
The jurisdiction rule
The nonce-verification rule
The freshness-conjuncatenation rule
The belief rule
Finally, we analyze the new protocol using the BAN logic rules and the assumptions.
From message 3 , we obtain (S1) ⊲ ( ,
From (p5), (S1), and Rule(a), we get
From (p12) and Rule(d), we get
From (S2), (S3), and Rule(c), we get
From (S4) and Rule(e), we get
From (p7), (S5), and Rule(b), we get
From message (m4), we have
From (p10), (S7), and Rule(a), we get
From (p1) and Rule(d), we get
From (S8), (S9), and Rule(c), we get
From (S10) and Rule(e), we get
From (P8), (S11), and Rule(b), we get (S12) | ≡ ←→ (g4).
From message (m5), we have
From (p11), (S6), (S13), and Rule(a), we get (S14) | ≡ | ∼ ( 1 , 2 , ←→ ).
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From (p2) and Rule(d), we get
From (S14), (S15), and Rule(c), we get (S16) | ≡ | ≡ ( 1 , 2 , ←→ ).
From (S16) and Rule(e), we get (S17) | ≡ | ≡ ←→ (g1).
Finally, From (P9), (S17), and Rule(b), we get (S18) | ≡ ←→ (g2).
According to (g1), (g2), (g3), and (g4), we conclude that the new protocol provides the mutual authentication and a shared secret key between the user and the server after a successful running of the protocol.
Formal Security Analysis.
Recent research has shown that user-chosen passwords follow the Zipf 's law [41] , a vastly different distribution from the uniform distribution. In this subsection, we provide a formal security analysis of the new protocol with the Zipf 's law.
Theorem 1. Let be the length of the biometric key
, let | ℎ| be the range space of hash function ℎ(⋅), and both and are the Zipf 's parameters [41] . Let be Send queries and 
Proof. Let be the event that A guesses bit for in the test session successfully. According to the new protocol, A does not need to guess or compute the user's identity since there is only one user. The games 0 to 3 are listed as follows.
Game 0 . This game corresponds to the real attack in the random oracle model. Hence 
Game 3 . This game simulates the smart card lost attack by querying oracle. If A wants to obtain the secret information of users, he tries online dictionary attack due to the low entropy of password or other computing modes to get which is used as the biometrics key with the message from . Unfortunately, A has to know ∈ {0, 1} with the probability approximated as 1/2 , because we use fuzzy extractor function to extract at most nearly random bits of . Even if using the Zipf 's law on passwords, we still have
Moreover, A cannot get any useful messages about the value of because of the independence and randomness of each session key. Thus, we have
Combined the above steps, we can get the result as follows:
4.3. Informal Security Analysis. In this subsection, informal security analysis is conducted to show that the new protocol can withstand various attacks.
Replay Attack. If A replays a former piece of user's messages to server, he will not success since a timestamp is used in each session to guarantee the freshness of time. If the information in a previous session is replayed, the interval between and will not be in an endurable range. Therefore, in the authentication phase A cannot pass the authentication in the first step. Hence, the new protocol can resist the replay attack.
Modification Attack. It is assumed that an adversary A intercepts the information transmitted on the public channel and intends to modify the information to pass the authentication. Unfortunately, the integrity of the transmitted messages in the new scheme is protected by using one-way hash function. Moreover, A cannot retrieve 1 and 2 from the intercepted messages, thus he cannot generate a legitimate authentication message. Therefore the new protocol can resist the modification attack.
Server Session Key Attack. In our proposed scheme, on one hand, session key contains 1 , 2 , , , 1 , and 2 which are different in every session and thus cannot be retrieved directly by a malicious adversary A. On the other hand, our scheme provides mutual authentication in the authentication phase and makes an improvement, i.e., both of the user and the server know whether has already been generated by each other. If the server 1 wants to obtain the session key by calculation, he has to obtain 2 since
Unfortunately, the specific value of 2 is known only to 2 and . After receiving the messages transmitted from the user, the server calculates 9 = ℎ( ‖ 1 ‖ 2 ) which means that the authentication is passed and valid session key has already be generated by each other. Therefore our scheme holds the security of session Key.
User Impersonation Attack. If A is going to impersonate a valid user, A has to retrieve , , and of to pass the authentication in calculating ℎ( ‖ ) = in login phase. It is impossible for him to make it as a result of our perfect user anonymity and the uniqueness of biometric message. If the adversary wants to get access to as a valid user with the messages , , , , 1 , and 2 , he cannot pass the check 2 = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ‖ ) and form a session key with the server he communicates with.
Forgery Attack. The forgery attack refers to the existence of a legitimate but malicious user A who attempts to falsify the identity information of another legitimate user to login and authenticate. In the communication between the legal server and the user , the real identity of is protected by , i.e., = ⊕ℎ( )⊕ℎ( ). In addition, the identity is different for each user. Therefore, the malicious user A cannot obtain the real identity of another legitimate user. Therefore, our scheme can prevent forgery attack.
Masquerade Attack. Under this attack, A can authenticate with the server as a legal user and attempt to acquire the session key using the information transmitted at the authentication phase. In order to resist this attack, all messages transmitted in the public channel contain the destination or source information, such as 2 = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ‖ ) and 4 = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ‖ ) with or . So that and verify whether one wants to be authenticated by the other. Therefore our protocol can resist the masquerade attack.
Smart Card Attack. If the user's smart card is stolen or lost and all the messages stored have been divulged by the adversary, there still no way for him to pass the authentication. At first, after acquiring , , , , and , A still cannot get and . So A is not capable of forging a valid user . Also, A cannot get any useful messages such as , , and using the messages stored in a smart card. Therefore, the new protocol is resistant to the stolen or lost smart card attack.
Offline Guessing Attack. A may get , , , , , and by side channel attack such as SPA and DPA. However, he cannot change the user's password without , ℎ( ), , or during the offline environment. In addition, one-way hash function is adopted to protect user's password. Since it is impossible for different user to own the same biometric template, offline guessing attack can be avoided in the new protocol. DoS Attack. DoS attack can seriously affect the efficiency of the server, causing the server to lose availability. However, all messages transmitted to the server and would be time stamped. With the help of the timestamp, the server and would verify the freshness and legitimacy of the message by checking 2 , 4 , and 6 . In addition, login operations require a fuzzy extractor to meet the biometric requirements. Therefore, our scheme can resist DoS attack.
Server Spoofing Attack. If A attempts to imitate a valid server, he is supposed to have the preshared key, a long-term secret key shared between and . In the new protocol, ℎ( ) and function as the preshared key which are transmitted through a secure channel and is unavailable to anyone other than and servers. Without , it is impossible for the adversary to calculate 1 in the authentication phase since 1 = 5 ⊕ . And also, without ℎ( ) and 1 , the adversary cannot get 2 since 2 = 7 ⊕ ℎ(
). Thus the adversary cannot imitate a valid server.
User Anonymity. The users real identity is protected by replacing with where = ⊕ ℎ( ) ⊕ ℎ( ). Also, due to the hash function and the secret key, either an outside adversary A or an honest-but-curious server cannot figure out through . Thus the weak anonymity of the user is guaranteed.
Regrettably, the anonymity of the new scheme is not perfect. For example, assuming that the server cooperates with a malicious user, the malicious user provides ℎ( ) by calculating ℎ( ) = ⊕ , and the server calculates through = ⊕ ⊕ℎ( ), then the server can calculate by calculating = ⊕ ℎ( ) ⊕ ℎ( ). Moreover, an adversary A with 's lost smart card can also compute 's identity. Therefore, our scheme just provides the weak anonymity.
Efficiency Analysis
Efficiency analysis is conducted in this section to evaluate the new protocol. The comparisons including the resistance, functionality, and performance are summarized. In Table 5 [43] . The following notations are defined in Table 4 .
Security comparison is offered by Table 5 . In Table 5 , "/" denotes that the security has not been analyzed until now. From Table 5 , it is easy to see that protocols of (S1), (S2), (S3), and (S4), which do not include the registration center into the authentication phase, can not resist the passive attack from an honest-but-curious server. Although (S5) is resistant to above attack, it can not resist the user impersonate attack and smart card attack. The new protocol, together with (S6), achieves all resistance requirements, since they implement the authentication with the help of the authentication center. Thus they are more secure than the first five protocols. Functionalities comparison is listed in Table 7 . The notations that appear in Table 7 are lists in Table 6 . It can be seen that (S1), (S2), (S3), and (S4) do not provide user revocation/reregistration functionality, and (S5) does not offer anonymity property. Only our new protocol and (S6) provide all five basic functionality requirements. Now we conduct the efficiency analysis including computation overhead and communication overhead. To compare with other related works, only login and authentication phase are considered. Tables 9 and 10 list the computation cost comparisons from different aspects. The notations that appear in Table 9 are listed in Table 8 . For the computation efficiency, we only calculate the number of hash functions, while ignore Exclusive OR operation and concatenating operation since they require little computational cost. Let denote the computation time for symmetric-key encryption/decryption which is known as about 0.005ms, ℎ denote the computation time for one-way hash function which is known as about 0.002ms, and denote the computation time for elliptic curve point multiplication which is known as about 2.226ms. Table 9 compares the computation time according to protocol's different phase. From Table 9 , we can find that the new protocols, together with (S1), (S2), (S3), and (S4), spend almost the same time since only hash function contributes to computation cost. On the other hand, (S5) and (S6) take more time for computation due to the expensive elliptic curve point multiplication operations. Table 10 compares the computation time according to different participants. The user's executing time in the new protocol only needs 0.014ms, which proves that the new protocol provides the most efficient use's computation. In terms of server's executing time, the new protocol spends almost the same time as that of the most efficient protocols, i.e., (S1), (S2), and (S3). To resist the passive attack from the honest-but-curious servers, (S5), (S6), and the new protocol introduce the registration center into the authentication phase, which would bring extra burden for the trusty registration center. As shown in Table 10 , needs extra 4.47ms for (S5) and extra 2.263ms for (S6). In the new protocol, is only used to transmit the secret information instead of authenticating user and server. As a result, the extra executing time for in the new protocol is only 0.008ms, which is much less than that of (S5) and (S6). Therefore, the new protocol is the most efficient one among the second kind of multiserver authentication protocols. In conclusion, among all of the multiserver protocols against the passive attack from an honest-but-curious attack, the new protocol is the most computational efficient one. Table 12 lists the new protocol's communication cost together with the other related protocols. Suppose the random number is 160 bits, the length of the user identity is 160 bits, the length of the timestamp is 16 bits, and the output length of one-way hash function is 160 bits if SHA-1 is adopted. Table 11 shows the notations that appear in Table 12 . In the new protocol, when logs in, he has to transmit 1 , , 2 , , , and ; thus the length of these messages is (160 * 5+16)/8 = 102 bytes. In the authentication phase, we introduce the registration center, so the communication cost is a little more than (S1), (S3), and (S4), about 180 bytes or so. Among all of the multiserver protocols against the passive attack from an honest-but-curious attack, the new protocol has the high communication efficient.
Combined with the security properties and the functionalities, we conclude that the new protocol and (S6) achieve all basic security properties and satisfy all functionalities. In terms of efficiency, (S6) spends much more computation time, bandwidth, and storage space compared with the new protocol. In conclusion, the new protocol is the most efficient multiserver authentication protocol which satisfies all basic security properties and functionalities.
Conclusion
In this paper, we found that a kind of multifactor multiserver authentication protocols can not resist the passive attack from an honest-but-curious servers. We took Wang et al.'s protocol as an example, to exhibit how an honest-but-curious server step by step obtained a session key which should be kept secret from him. Moreover, we observed that the revocation and reregistration process in their protocol is incorrect. To remedy these weaknesses, this paper proposed a novel multiserver authentication protocol. The new protocol satisfies comprehensive demands of security and provides versatile and practical functionalities. Compared with the related protocols in computation cost and communication cost, the new protocol is the most efficient multiserver authentication protocol which satisfies all basic security properties and functionalities. Therefore, the new protocol is secure and relatively efficient in the remote distributed authentication networks. We have noticed that this kind of attack may also exist in other likewise environment, such as the multifactor multigateway authentication protocol in the wireless sensor networks. As a future work, we would apply the passive attack from an honest-but-curious gateway to the multifactor multigateway authentication protocol in the wireless sensor network and try to design secure protocols for multigateway wireless sensor network.
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